Telcoin

TAN Improvement Proposal (TANIP)

Overview

The following section describes the TAN Improvement Proposal (TANIP) process. The TANIP is used by the TAN Council to provision(plan and finance) improvements to the TAN system, regulate the flow of TEL issuance throughout TAN, and determine and enforce operational rules on TAN including harvesting.

TANIP: Proposal Authors

  • TAN Forum: Any registered member of the Telcoin forum may submit a TANIP to the TANIP forum channel for review by the community
  • TAN Council: All TAN Council members holding a TANNFT, TAL members or other designated authors as determined by the Miner Assembly may submit TANIP proposals to the TAN Council snapshot for voting.
  • Veto: All Compliance Council and Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) members, using the CCIP process, may submit TANIP veto proposals to the Compliance Council snapshot at any point during the formal voting process and within 72 hours afterwards.

TANIP: Voters

  • TAN Council: All TAN Council members holding a TANNFT may vote on a TANIP in the TAN Council snapshot.
  • Compliance Council: All Compliance Council members holding a CCNFT may vote to veto a TANIP proposal using the CCIP process.

TANIP: Implementation units

  • TAN Council: Responsible for instructing, coordinating, or administering the implementation of new policies and procedures internally or with third-parties.
  • TAO: At the request of the TAN Council, enforces rules, maintains and alters existing components, assists with the coordination of third parties to construct new facilities, and documents the outcome of TANIP proposals on Telcoin.org.

TAN Governance System: Attributes

The TAN Council sets, enforces, and refines the day to day operational rules for interacting with the Telcoin Application Network rules, including setting TEL harvesting rules. The TAO, the Telcoin Association’s wholly-owned production and administration unit, services to produce and administer collective goods at the direction and financing of the Association and all of its Miner Councils.

TAN Council: Authority and Decision-making Rules

TAN Council governs TAN harvesting rules using the TANIP process. The Platform and Treasury Council use the TELIP process to govern TEL Treasury distribution rules, which dictates the TEL available to be harvested on TAN.

  • Council | Representation | Process, Domain of Authority | Decision-making Rules
  • TAN Council | TAN Council
    · Members: 6
    · Representation:
    Stakers: 2 reps
    Developers: 2 reps
    Liquidity Miners: 1 rep
    Validators: 1 rep | Telcoin Application Network Improvement Proposal (TANIP)

    TAN operational rules including allocation, harvesting, planning and financing, information, communication. | Proposal Authority: TAN Council, TAO

    Approval: 5 out of 6
    Quorum: 100%
    Duration: 120 hours
    Channel: telcointancouncil.eth

TANIP: Authority Rules

The TANIP process may be used by the TAN Council to approve and implement the following types of rules.

  • Platform-wide, Treasury Proposals: Any proposal that involves the TEL Treasury inventory, storage and distribution including:
  • Platform Provisioning and Development: Improvements that provide for the construction and maintenance of public goods.
    • Example: The Councils vote to launch a Telcoin merchandise marketplace, specify the requirements, and distribute TEL issuance to the producers responsible for implementation.
  • TEL: Treasury, Token Contracts
    • TEL Treasury Inventory and Allocation Rules: Proposals that alter the annual allocation of TEL issuance from the Treasury to networks treasuries and governing Council members.
      • Example: A proposal to reduce TEL issuance to meet the sustainability formula in which the total quantity of annual issuance must equal the total quantity of TEL burned and minted each year.
    • TEL Treasury Storage & Distribution Mechanisms: Proposals that alter the infrastructure used to store and distribute TEL issuance from the TEL treasury.
      • Example: A proposal to replace TEL Treasury sablier streams with another mechanism.
    • TEL Token and Redemption Contracts: Proposals that alter the TEL token contract and token swap contracts.
  • Governance Infrastructure: Proposals that alter the infrastructure used to govern and manage the system.
    • Example: A proposal that changes the TELx Council snapshot to another governance technology, such as Aragon.
  • Telcoin Network: After Telcoin Network is live with 10, authorized block producing validators with TEL staked for PoS consensus, proposals that alter Telcoin Network rules and systems.
    • Example: A proposal that alters the allocation and basis formulas for Telcoin Network issuance.
  • Telcoin Association and other legal structures
    • Dissolution: Proposals that dissolve the Telcoin Association in favor of a new entity.
    • Mission, Vision, Values: Proposals that add, subtract, or otherwise alter the Mission Vision and Values articulated in the Telcoin Association Constitution.

TAN: TEL Harvesting Rules

Merchant and Retail Stakers and Developers stake TEL, produce Platform adoption and mobile apps respectively, and each harvest 333.33M TEL from TAN in year one at a rate of 6.41M TEL per week according to rules that are set, enforced, and refined by the TAN Council and self-execute in code built into the system itself.

Developers: TEL Harvesting Rules

Produce mobile applications that integrate with the Telcoin Platform and enable users to access its services.

  • Eligibility and Authorization Rules: All GSMA members located in non-sanctioned jurisdictions who are approved by the Compliance Council, stake TEL on TAN, and deploy a compliant Telcoin mobile application may participate as a Developer.
  • TEL Allocation (Y1): 166.66M TEL in year one at a rate of 3,205,128.205 TEL per week.
  • Basis Formula for Income: Pro-rata share of their mobile user base’s:
    • (Referral fees + TELx exchange fees + Telcoin Network gas fees paid)/week vs other developers
  • Maximum Weekly TEL Issuance: Developers may mine their accrued weekly issuance if their total staked TEL balance throughout the entire week is greater than their lifetime issuance earnings plus issuance income during the week.
    • Formula: Total staked TEL > (TEL issuance income/ lifetime + TEL issuance income/ current week)
    • Excess TEL Issuance: Any excess TEL which has not been mined from TAN due to lack of staked TEL will be distributed back to the TAN Council safe to be allocated by the TAN Council.

Stakers: TEL Harvesting Rules

Produce adoption of the Telcoin Platform as infrastructure for settling payments and other blockchain use cases.

  • Eligibility and Authorization Rules: All Telcoin mobile application customers who enter another user’s referral code and stake TEL on Telcoin Application Network may participate as Stakers.
  • Merchant Stakers
    • TEL Allocation (Y1): 166.66M TEL in year one at a rate of 3,205,128.205 TEL per week.
    • Basis: Pro-rata share of their (fees paid + their referred users’ fees paid) vs other merchant stakers each week.
  • Retail Stakers
    • TEL Allocation (Y1): 166.66M TEL in year one at a rate of 3,205,128.205 TEL per week.
    • Basis: Pro-rata share of their (fees paid + their referred users’ fees paid) vs other retail stakers each week.
  • All Stakers
    • Maximum TEL Issuance: Stakers may mine their accrued weekly issuance if their total staked TEL balance throughout the entire week is greater than their lifetime TEL issuance earnings plus issuance income during the week.
    • Excess TEL: Any excess TEL which has not been mined from TAN during the week will be distributed to the TAN Council safe to be allocated by the TAN Council.
    • Time Slots: Each harvesting period lasts for 7 days starting and ending at 00:00 UTC time at the beginning of each week.
    • Maximum TEL Issuance: Stakers may mine their accrued weekly issuance if their total staked TEL balance throughout the entire week is greater than their lifetime TEL issuance earnings plus issuance income during the week.
    • Excess TEL: Any excess TEL which has not been mined from TAN during the week will be distributed to the TAN Council safe to be allocated by the TAN Council.
    • Time Slots: Each harvesting period lasts for 7 days starting and ending at 00:00 UTC time at the beginning of each week.

TANIP: Process

  1. TANIP Forum Proposal: Forum members submit a proposal to TANIP channel on the Telcoin forum.
  2. TAN Council Proposal: A TAN Council, TAO member, or other designated author on the TAN Council snapshot page decides to submit the proposal to the TAN Council Snapshot for voting.
  3. TAN Council Vote: The TAN Council must vote with 5/6 approval within 120 hours (5 days) from TAN Council snapshot proposal submission, or else the proposal will not pass.
    1. Approval Rate: 5/6
    2. Duration: 120 hours (5 days) If the proposal receives at least 5/6 approval within 5 days of submission, it is affirmed.
  4. Compliance Council Veto Proposal: At any point during the TANIP voting process and within 72 hours after it has been affirmed by the TAN Council, Compliance Council or TAO members may submit a veto proposal to the Compliance Council snapshot using the CCIP process.
  5. Compliance Council Vote: The Compliance Council must vote to veto the proposal within 72 hours after it is approved by the TAN Council, or else the proposal will be approved. .
    • Approval (Veto) Rate: 3/4
    • Duration: 72 hours (3 days)
  6. Implementation:
    1. Off-Chain: The TAN Council either implements the proposal itself or works with the TAO or other third parties to implement the update.
    2. TEL Transfers: TEL is transferred from the TAN Safe to the intended address as a result of the affirmation of the proposal.
  7. Documentation: The Proposal Author from the TAN Council coordinates with the TAO (or another administrator as determined by the TAN Council) to update Telcoin.org TANIP documentation.

Outcomes and Feedback

  • Proposal Affirmed: If the proposal is affirmed through the TANIP process, it will be implemented and documented according to the specification outlined in the proposal.
  • Proposal Rejected: If the proposal is rejected by the TAN Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.
  • Proposal Vetoed: If the proposal is vetoed by the Compliance Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.

Evaluative Criteria

Consistency with Shared Values: Is the proposed improvement consistent with the the Mission, Vision, Values defined in Article 4.1 (a-c) of the Telcoin Association Constitution?

  • Overview: The Telcoin Association Constitution is a living, breathing document subject to indefinite adaptation by the Miner Assembly. The mission, vision, and values, collectively (’Mission’) found in Article 4.1(a, b, c) serves as a moral basis used by Miners to interpret and determine what actions and outcomes are acceptable in governance processes.

Feasibility: Technical, Economic, Financial, Legal, Political

  • Technical Feasibility: Can it be done? Is the potential course of action within the real of possibilities given existing knowledge and technical capabilities?
  • Economic Feasibility: Is it worth doing? Will the expected benefits to be derived from any course of action exceed the expected costs including the cost of other opportunities foregone? If this criterion can not be met, a course of action will leave people worse off than better off.
  • Financial Feasibility: Can sufficient revenues be generated with reference to a proposed course of action to cover expenditures?
  • Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
  • Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?

General Performance Indicators: Staked TEL, users, actors, volume, fees, buy-backs

  • Staked TEL: Total by Stakers and Developers for use in production, harvesting and governance processes
  • Number of Actors: Number of users, referred users, stakers, developers over time
  • Fees: Referral and transaction fees earned by stakers and developers over time
  • Buy-backs: Total TEL buy-backs from referral fees

Sustainability: Can the quantity of TEL issuance units available to be harvested by Developers and Stakers according to TAN Harvesting Rules sustain at current levels over time?

  • Definition and Importance
    • Definition: Can the quantity of benefits produced by the system and extracted by appropriators sustain over time?
    • Importance: If the stock of benefits available to be extracted from a system are exhausted, the incentives to participate are proportionally reduced for future generations.
  • Indicators
    • Renewability Formula
      • (Total TEL burned on TAN - Total TEL issued to TAN)/time
      • Note: The total TEL burned on Telcoin Network replenishes in proportionate quantity to the TEL Treasury to be harvested by future generations of miners.

Participation: To what extent are (1) the community of local miners and (2) the TAN Council and its members participating in co-production and deliberation processes?

  • Definition and Importance
    • Definition: Measured by the number of actors and their level of involvement in associated processes.
    • Importance: Participation tends to increase legitimacy; co-production can be especially effective form of participation.
  • Indicators: Local Miners and TAN Council
    • Local Miners: Co-production and deliberation
      • Co-Production: The number of Developers and Stakers with TEL staked in Miner production processes,
      • Deliberation: The number of voters in council member selection processes as measured by quorum rates and the general participation of Miners in discussions related to specific improvement proposals.
    • TAN Council: Co-production and deliberation
      • Co-Production: The number of TAN Council Members with TEL staked in production processes on TAN (optional public disclosure).
      • Deliberation: The number of TAN Council members who vote on TANIP proposal(s) as measured by quorum rates and the general participation by each TAN Council member in discussions with the community related to specific proposals.

Economic Efficiency: How economically efficient is the proposed improvement as measured by the magnitude of the change in the flow of net benefits associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources?

  • Definition and Importance
    • Definition: Measured by the magnitude of the change in the flow of net benefits associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources.
    • Importance: The concept of efficiency often plays a central role in studies estimating the benefits and costs or rates of return to investments that are often used to determine the economic feasibility or desirability of public policies. (E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 66)
  • Indicators
    • (Net Increase in Benefits over time - Net Increase in Costs over time)
      • E.g. (Total referral and transaction fees 3 months after proposal - total referral and transaction fees three months before proposal) - (Total issuance three months after proposal - total issuance three months before proposal)

Legitimacy: Do miners view the deliberation process undertaken by the TAN Council related to a particular TANIP as legitimate?

  • Definition and Importance
    • Definition: Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes.
    • Importance: Lack of legitimacy as seen by participants may lead to conflict between actors and reduce participation rates.
  • Indicators
    • Miner Social: Intensity of preferences opposed to an IP as demonstrated on the forum proposal, in the discord, and other discussions.
    • Delegations: The number of liquid delegations proposals submitted by miners to replace Council Members in relation to specific IPs and the resulting outcomes.
    • Veto: The number of Veto proposals and the voting outcome by the Compliance Council in relation to a TANIP.
    • Miner Council: The date of a proposal submission, the level of deliberation undertaken between council members and with the community.

Proportional Equivalence: Are TAN harvesting rules suitable to TAN Network conditions? Are the benefits obtained by TAN miners proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money?

  • Definition and Importance
    • Definition: The rules-in-use allocate benefits proportional to inputs required.(Understanding Institutional Diversity, 262-3, E. Ostrom).
    • Importance: When the rules related to the distribution of benefits are made broadly consistent with the distribution of costs, participants are more willing to pitch in to keep a resource well-maintained and sustainable. Relating user inputs to the benefits they obtain is a crucial element of establishing a fair system. If some users get all the benefits and pay few of the costs, others are not willing to follow rules over time. Thus, fairness is a crucial attribute of the rules of robust systems. (Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263, E. Ostrom)
  • Indicators: Harvesting rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of TEL units are related to local conditions. The benefits obtained by users from TAN, as determined by harvesting rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as determined by provisioning rules.
    • Issuance Harvesting: Total issuance harvested < total fees
    • Fiscal Equivalence: Total costs to produce improvements < total fees

Accountability: Are the TAN Council and its members accountable to Miner Groups concerning the policies and rules they choose?

  • Definition and Importance
    • Definition: When evaluating collective-choice or constitutional-choice levels, one can ask whether officials are accountable to citizens concerning the policies and rules chosen.
    • Importance: Without accountability, actors can engage in the various opportunistic, strategic behaviors. Achieving accountability requires that information about the preferences of citizens be available to decision makers.
  • Indicators: The TAN Council and its members must be accountable to Miners concerning the rules and improvements they implement.
    • Information-sharing: The community has numerous forums and ample time within deliberation processes to share their preferences with Council members.
    • Enforcement Authority: If the TAN Council proposes to implement something the community of Miners disagrees with, Miners may submit liquid delegation proposals to replace representatives at any time.