Governance
TEL Improvement Proposal (TELIP)
Overview
The following section describes the context and procedure encompassed by the TEL Improvement Proposal (TELIP), the process used by the Platform and Treasury Councils to set, enforce and refine the rules related to the TEL Treasury and token, Telcoin Network, and all other platform-wide policies.
TELIP Proposal Authors
- TELIP Forum: Any registered member of the Telcoin forum may submit a TELIP to the TELIP forum channel for review by the community.
- Platform Council: All Platform Council members holding a PCNFT, Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) members or other designated authors as determined by the Miner Assembly may submit TELIP proposals to the Platform Council snapshot for voting.
- Treasury Council: After a TELIP proposal has been affirmed by the Platform Council, Platform members holding a PCNFT, TAO members or other designated authors as determined by the Miner Assembly may submit TELIP proposals to the Treasury Council snapshot for voting.
- Veto: All Compliance Council and TAO members, using the CCIP process, may submit TELIP veto proposals to the Compliance Council snapshot at any point during the formal voting process and within 72 hours afterwards.
TELIP Voters
- Platform Council: All Platform Council members holding a PCNFT may vote on a TELIP in the Platform Council snapshot.
- Treasury Council: All Treasury Council members holding a TCNFT may vote on a TELIP in the Treasury Council snapshot.
- Compliance Council: All Compliance Council members holding a CCNFT may vote to veto A TELIP using the CCIP process.
TELIP Implementation units
- Platform Council: Responsible for instructing, coordinating, or administering the implementation of new rules, procedures, improvements related to platform-wide facilities, communication channels, and governance infrastructure either internally or with third-parties.
- Treasury Council: Responsible for instructing, coordinating, or administering the implementation of new rules, procedures, improvements related to the TEL treasury and simulates transactions to ensure they reach the intended destination, either internally or with third-parties.
- TAO: At the request of the Platform and/or Treasury Council, enforces rules, maintains and alters existing components, assists with the coordination of third parties to construct new facilities, and documents the outcome of TELIP proposals on Telcoin.org.
TELIP: Authority and Decision-making Rules
- Councils | Representation | Process, Domain of Authority | Decision-making Rules
- Platform Council, Treasury Council | Platform Council
· Members: 8
· Representation: Balanced across all four Miner Groups.
Treasury Council
· Members: 4
· Representation: Balanced across all four Miner Groups. | TEL Improvement Proposal (TELIP)
Platform-wide rules
that involve the TEL Treasury, TEL token contract, Telcoin Network, the Telcoin Association Constitution, and governance infrastructure. | 1. Platform Council: Must approve before submitting to the Treasury Council
Approval: 6 out of 8
Quorum: 100%
Duration: 120 hours
Channel: telcoinplatformcouncil.eth
2. Treasury Council: Must vote after the Platform Council has affirmed.
Approval: 4 out of 4
Quorum: 100%
Duration: 72 hours
Channel: telcointreasurycouncil.eth
TELIP: Authority Rules
The TELIP process may be used by the Platform and Treasury Council to approve and implement the following types of rules.
- Platform-wide, Treasury Proposals: Any proposal that involves the TEL Treasury inventory, storage and distribution including:
- Platform Provisioning and Development: Improvements that provide for the construction and maintenance of public goods.
- Example: The Councils vote to launch a Telcoin merchandise marketplace, specify the requirements, and distribute TEL issuance to the producers responsible for implementation.
- TEL: Treasury, Token Contracts
- TEL Treasury Inventory and Allocation Rules: Proposals that alter the annual allocation of TEL issuance from the Treasury to networks treasuries and governing Council members.
- Example: A proposal to reduce TEL issuance to meet the sustainability formula in which the total quantity of annual issuance must equal the total quantity of TEL burned and minted each year.
- TEL Treasury Storage & Distribution Mechanisms: Proposals that alter the infrastructure used to store and distribute TEL issuance from the TEL treasury.
- Example: A proposal to replace TEL Treasury sablier streams with another mechanism.
- TEL Token and Redemption Contracts: Proposals that alter the TEL token contract and token swap contracts.
- TEL Treasury Inventory and Allocation Rules: Proposals that alter the annual allocation of TEL issuance from the Treasury to networks treasuries and governing Council members.
- Governance Infrastructure: Proposals that alter the infrastructure used to govern and manage the system.
- Example: A proposal that changes the TELx Council snapshot to another governance technology, such as Aragon.
- Telcoin Network: After Telcoin Network is live with 10, authorized block producing validators with TEL staked for PoS consensus, proposals that alter Telcoin Network rules and systems.
- Example: A proposal that alters the allocation and basis formulas for Telcoin Network issuance.
- Telcoin Association and other legal structures
- Dissolution: Proposals that dissolve the Telcoin Association in favor of a new entity.
- Mission, Vision, Values: Proposals that add, subtract, or otherwise alter the Mission Vision and Values articulated in the Telcoin Association Constitution.
TELIP Process and Outcomes
- TELIP Forum Proposal: Forum members submit a proposal to TELIP channel on the Telcoin forum.
- Platform Council Proposal: A Platform Council, TAO member, or other designated author on the Platform Council snapshot page decides to submits the proposal to the Platform Council Snapshot for voting.
- Platform Council Vote: The Platform Council must vote with 6/8 approval within 120 hours (5 days) from Platform Council snapshot proposal submission, or else the proposal will not pass.
- Approval Rate: 6/8
- Duration: 120 hours (5 days)
- Treasury Council Proposal: After the TELIP has been affirmed by the Platform Council, the proposal author may submit the TELIP to the Treasury Council snapshot for voting.
- Treasury Council Vote: The Treasury Council must vote with 4/4 approval within 120 hours (5 days) from Treasury Council snapshot proposal submission, or else the proposal will not pass.
- Approval Rate: 4/4
- Duration: 72 hours or 3 days
- Compliance Council Veto Proposal: At any point during the TELIP voting process and within 72 hours after it has been affirmed by the Treasury Council, Compliance Council or TAO members may submit a veto proposal to the Compliance Council snapshot using the CCIP process.
- Compliance Council Vote: The Compliance Council must vote to veto the proposal within 72 hours after it is approved by the Treasury Council, or else the proposal will be approved.
- Approval (Veto) Rate: 3/4
- Duration: 72 hours (3 days)
- Implementation:
- Off-Chain: The Platform Council, Treasury Council, or Compliance Council either implements the proposal itself or works with the TAO or other third parties to implement the update.
- TEL Transfers: TEL is transferred from the Treasury Wallet to the intended address as a result of the affirmation of the proposal.
- Documentation: The Proposal Author from the Platform Council coordinates with the TAO (or another administrator as determined by the Platform Council) to update Telcoin.org TELIP documentation.
Outcomes
- Approved by the Platform Council: The proposal author may submit the TELIP proposal to the Treasury Council snapshot for voting.
- Rejected by the Platform Council: Council members who vote against a proposal or abstain must provide a rationale and changes that would be needed to pass a proposal.
- Approved by the Treasury Council: The proposal will be automatically submitted to the Compliance Council guard for review.
- Rejected by the Treasury Council: Treasury Council members who vote against or abstain from a proposal must share their rationale and constructive feedback with the proposal author when they submit their vote.
- Veto by Compliance Council: The proposal will be vetoed. Compliance Council members who voted to veto the proposal must provide their rationale and constructive feedback at the time of the vote.
- No Veto(Approved): If the Compliance Council fails to veto a proposal, it will be affirmed, implemented, and documented.
Evaluative Criteria
Consistency with Shared Values: Is the proposed improvement consistent with the the Mission, Vision, Values defined in Article 4.1 (a-c) of the Telcoin Association Constitution?
- Overview: The Telcoin Association Constitution is a living, breathing document subject to indefinite adaptation by the Miner Assembly. The mission, vision, and values, collectively (’Mission’) found in Article 4.1(a, b, c) serves as a moral basis used by Miners to interpret and determine what actions and outcomes are acceptable in governance processes.
Feasibility: Technical, Economic, Financial, Legal, Political
- Technical Feasibility: Can it be done? Is the potential course of action within the real of possibilities given existing knowledge and technical capabilities?
- Economic Feasibility: Is it worth doing? Will the expected benefits to be derived from any course of action exceed the expected costs including the cost of other opportunities foregone? If this criterion can not be met, a course of action will leave people worse off than better off.
- Financial Feasibility: Can sufficient revenues be generated with reference to a proposed course of action to cover expenditures?
- Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
- Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?
General Performance Indicators: Staked TEL, actors, volume, fees
- Staked TEL: Total TEL staked by miners for use in production, harvesting and governance processes
- Number of Actors: Number of users, Miners over time
- Fees: Fees earned by Miners over time
Sustainability: Can the quantity of TEL issuance units distributed from the TEL Treasury according to issuance distribution rules sustain at current levels over time?
- Definition and Importance
- Definition: Can the quantity of benefits produced by the system and extracted by appropriators sustain over time?
- Importance: If the stock of benefits available to be extracted from a system are exhausted, the incentives to participate are proportionally reduced for future generations.
- Indicators
- Renewability Formula:
- (Total TEL burned on Platform - Total TEL issued from Platform)/time
- Note: The total TEL burned on Telcoin Network replenishes in proportionate quantity to the TEL Treasury to be harvested by future generations of miners.
- Renewability Formula:
Participation: To what extent are (1) the community of miners and (2) the Platform, Treasury Councils and its members participating in co-production and deliberation processes?
- Definition and Importance
- Definition: Measured by the number of actors and their level of involvement in associated processes.
- Importance: Participation tends to increase legitimacy; co-production can be especially effective form of participation.
- Indicators: Miners, Platform Council, Treasury Council
- Miners: Co-production and deliberation
- Co-Production: The number of Miners with TEL staked in Miner production processes,
- Deliberation: The number of voters in council member selection processes as measured by quorum rates and the general participation of Miners in discussions related to specific improvement proposals.
- Platform and Treasury Councils: Co-production and deliberation
- Co-Production: The number of Platform and Treasury Council Members with TEL staked in production processes.
- Deliberation: The number of Platform and Treasury Council members who vote on TELIP proposal(s) as measured by quorum rates and the general participation by each Platform and Treasury Council member in discussions with the community related to specific proposals.
- Miners: Co-production and deliberation
Economic Efficiency: How economically efficient is the proposed improvement as measured by the magnitude of the change in the flow of net benefits associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources?
- Definition and Importance
- Definition: Measured by the magnitude of the change in the flow of net benefits associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources.
- Importance: The concept of efficiency often plays a central role in studies estimating the benefits and costs or rates of return to investments that are often used to determine the economic feasibility or desirability of public policies. (E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 66)
- Indicators
- (Net Increase in Benefits over time - Net Increase in Costs over time)
- E.g. (Total referral and transaction fees 3 months after proposal - total referral and transaction fees three months before proposal) - (Total issuance three months after proposal - total issuance three months before proposal)
- (Net Increase in Benefits over time - Net Increase in Costs over time)
Legitimacy: Do miners view the deliberation process undertaken by the Platform and Treasury Councils related to a particular TELIP as legitimate?
- Definition and Importance
- Definition: Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes.
- Importance: Lack of legitimacy as seen by participants may lead to conflict between actors and reduce participation rates.
- Indicators
- Miner Social: Intensity of preferences opposed to an IP as demonstrated on the forum proposal, in the discord, and other discussions.
- Delegations: The number of liquid delegations proposals submitted by miners to replace Council Members in relation to specific IPs and the resulting outcomes.
- Veto: The number of Veto proposals and the voting outcome by the Compliance Council in relation to a TELIP.
- Miner Council: The date of a proposal submission, the level of deliberation undertaken between council members and with the community.
Proportional Equivalence: Are TEL Treasury distribution levels suitable to Platform conditions? Are the benefits obtained by miners proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money?
- Definition and Importance
- Definition: The rules-in-use allocate benefits proportional to inputs required.(Understanding Institutional Diversity, 262-3, E. Ostrom).
- Importance: When the rules related to the distribution of benefits are made broadly consistent with the distribution of costs, participants are more willing to pitch in to keep a resource well-maintained and sustainable. Relating user inputs to the benefits they obtain is a crucial element of establishing a fair system. If some users get all the benefits and pay few of the costs, others are not willing to follow rules over time. Thus, fairness is a crucial attribute of the rules of robust systems. (Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263, E. Ostrom)
- Indicators: Harvesting rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of TEL units are related to local conditions. The benefits obtained by miners from the Platform, as determined by harvesting rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as determined by provisioning rules.
- Issuance Harvesting: Total issuance harvested < total fees
- Fiscal Equivalence: Total costs to produce improvements < total fees
Accountability: Are the Platform, Treasury Council and their members accountable to Miner Groups concerning the policies and rules they choose?
- Definition and Importance
- Definition: When evaluating collective-choice or constitutional-choice levels, one can ask whether officials are accountable to citizens concerning the policies and rules chosen.
- Importance: Without accountability, actors can engage in the various opportunistic, strategic behaviors. Achieving accountability requires that information about the preferences of citizens be available to decision makers.
- Indicators: The Platform, Treasury Council and their members must be accountable to Miners concerning the rules and improvements they implement.
- Information-sharing: The community has numerous forums and ample time within deliberation processes to share their preferences with Council members.
- Enforcement Authority: If the system-wide Councils propose to implement something the community of Miners disagrees with, Miners may submit liquid delegation proposals to replace representatives at any time.
TNIP
TNIPs as a Subsidiary to TELIPs:
Telcoin Network Improvement Proposals (TNIPs) are a subsidiary process to the TELIP process, specifically focused on the technical and protocol implementation details of the Telcoin Network. The main motivation behind TNIPs is to discuss feature designs transparently and coordinate engineering efforts effectively.
- Before Mainnet Launch with quorum:
- Role of TAO: Prior to the Telcoin Network mainnet launch with 10 authorized validators, TNIPs are utilized by Telcoin Autonomous Operations Ltd. (TAO) to propose technical changes and upgrades to the Telcoin Network.
- Primary Method: During this period, TNIPs serve as the primary method for introducing technical enhancements to the network.
- After Mainnet Launch with quorum:
- Prerequisite for TELIPs: Once the Telcoin Network mainnet is live with 10 validators staking TEL for proof-of-stake consensus, TNIPs become a prerequisite for proposing technical changes through the TELIP process.
- Formal Approval via TELIP: All TNIPs must be formally approved using the TELIP process to be implemented on the Telcoin Network.
- Proposal Origination: While it's encouraged that all technical proposals originate as TNIPs, it is not strictly required by the TELIP rules. However, proposals lacking a proper TNIP are unlikely to receive approval due to the system's technical complexity and mission-critical nature.
For more detailed information on TNIPs, please visit tnips.telcoin.network. This resource provides comprehensive guidelines on the TNIP process and how to participate.